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COMES NOW Plaintiff-Appellant Brian and Christie, Inc., dibla Taco Time ("Taco 
Time"), by and through counsel of record, and hereby submits its Reply Brief as follows: 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
The district court's decision granting summaq judgment dismissing Taco Time's 
negligence claim is erroneous as a matter of law. It should be reversed and the case remanded for 
trial. The economic loss rule does not apply given the undisputed facts. 
This Court's recent decision in Aardema v. U S. Dairy Systems, Inc., 2009 Opinion No. 
107 (filed August 24,2009),' addresses the economic loss rule. It clarifies that the "underlying 
contract that is the subject of the lawsuit is fke subject oftke transaction" (emphasis added)." 
Aardema, supra at p. 6, note 2. Such clarification of preexisting case law on the economic law 
issue appears dispositive of this appeal. 
There are three (3) "underlying contracts" arguably involved in the instant case: (1) the 
Taco Time-Sign Pro contract to repair and install the neon signs and transformers? (2) the Taco 
'The Court's opinion in Aardema was released on August 24,2009. Leishman's 
respondent's brief was signed and mailed for filing and service the next day on August 25,2009, 
but does not acknowledge or mention the opinion. 
'Two neon signs were installed on two different exterior vertical walls of the building. 
Each sign had a transformer which was installed nearby on the roof. The neon sign on the front 
of the building, and related transformer was installed on the roof of the building, are the 
identified origin and cause of the fire in this case. The components, location, and physical 
configuration of the subject neon sign and transformer are undisputed and as described in the 
Affidavit, attached Report, and attached photos of Robert "Jake" Jacobsen. R., Vol. 2, p. 241- 
242; Ex. A thereto (Preliminaty Report)(ld., pp. 249-250,251); Ex. C thereto (8/21/06 
supplemental letter report)(Id., p. 254-256), and attached photos #13, #63, #76, #77(ld., pp. 257- 
260). A copy of the supplemental letter report and color photos are attached in the appendix 
hereto. 
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Tim~General Contractor contract for remodel of the pre-existing building; and (3) the General 
Contractor-Leishman subcontract for electrical work. There are no other "underlying contracts" 
which are the "subject of the transaction." 
It is undisputed there is "other property damage" to parts of the building involved 
with of the three "underlying contracts."For example, the Second Affidavit of Brian Larsen, 
7 7, states: 
"The majority of the fire damage was sustained in the original 
portions of the building. . . ." 
R., Vol. 11, p. 1 11. Larsen's testimony quoted above is uncontroverted by any other evidence. 
Damage to other parts of the building; which were not involved with the three contracts 
identified above, is sufficient to make the economic loss rule non-applicable. Thus, general 
tortinegligence principles for property damage apply. 
In addition, setting the building aside, it is undisputed there is "other property damage" to 
equipment, fixtures, inventory, and other contents and personal property which were located in 
the building at the time of the fire. Such items were also involved with the g i  of the three 
"underlying contracts" identified above. Examples include: cash registers, inventory food items, 
janitorial and bathroom supplies, etc. Such damage to such equipment, inventory, personal 
property, etc., which are unrelated to the three "underlying contracts" identified above, is 
sufficient to make the economic loss rule non-appIicabIe. Again, general tort/negligence 
principles for property damage thus apply. 
The combination of damage to other parts of the building, andlor damage to equipment, 
fixtures, inventory, and other contents and personal property, which are undisputed as having 
occurred, all of which are unrelated to the three "underlying contracts" discussed above, establish 
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beyond all doubt that the economic loss rule is non-applicable. They were also not the "subject 
of the transaction" per Aardenta. The economic loss rule does not apply. Taco Time is entitled 
to recover all property damage, together with purely economic losses (i.e., lost profits) against 
Leishman based on a negligence cause of action. 
In addition, it is unnecessaq to differentiate further between which one or more of the 
three "underlying contracts" identified above are determined to be the actual "subject of the 
transaction." It does not matter. Under any or all of them, there still remains "other property 
damage" beyond their scope which therefore does not change the conclusion that the economic 
loss rule does not apply. Thus, no material factual issue is raised to non-applicability of the 
economic loss rule as to which of the three "underlying contracts" identified above are deemed 
the "subject of the transaction" in this case. Again, it does not matter. Under any one of them, 
the rule does not apply because there exists "other property damage" beyond the scope of all of 
them. 
In Aardema, supra atp.  7, the Court reversed and remanded holding an issue of fact as to 
whether there was actual injury to the plaintiff's cows or the cows' teats from the milking 
machines because the evidence suggested such "could" be the case, but it was not definitely 
establisl~ed. 
In contrast, here the undisputed evidence establishes such "other property damage" as 
discussed above. Thus, unlike Aardema, there is no necessity to remand to determine whether 
"other property damage" exists. Here, where such is the case, the outcome is properly 
determined on appeal that the economic loss rule does not apply as a matter of law. There is no 
threshold factual issue whether "other property damage" exists; it clearly does exist. 
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Under such an evidentiary record, Taco Time requests this Court's ruling that the 
economic loss rule does not apply as a matter of law. Such ruling will completely eliminate the 
rule from this case once and for all for further proceedings in the event of reversal and remand. 
On the other hand, if the Court does not hold that the economic loss rule does not apply 
as a matter of law, then Leishman will continue to "make mischief asserting it in further 
proceeaings. Leishman will likely seek to persuade the district court again that the economic rule 
applies to some or all of the damages; that damages should be "parsed" as it argues in Part F of 
its respondent's brief at pages 32-34; or that this Court's failure to hold the rule non-applicable as 
a matter of law somehow implies the opposite. More confusion, distraction, and legal error are 
likely to occur in any further proceedings. The likelihood of a second appeal after any trial is 
increased. The economic loss rule should be declared not applicable as a matter of law thus 
ending any consideration of it. 
Aardema, and foregoing discussion in light of it, refutes Leishrnan's contention that "the 
entire building" is the "subject of the transaction." Such is the foundation to Leishman's 
argument and position on this appeal. Such is the foundation of the district court's summary 
judgment decision. If such is legal error, as Taco Time contends, then reversal and remand is 
required. Taco Time submits that the "entire building" as the "subject of the transaction" is 
untenable in light of Aardema which directs otherwise. 
If the "entire building" cannot be the "subject of the transaction," per Aardema, as Taco 
Time contends, then such appears dispositive, and reversal and remand is required. In such case, 
Leishman's additional arguments and authorities asserted in its respondent's are largely 
immaterial and irrelevant to proper disposition of this appeal. 
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In the event the case is reversed and remanded because the economic loss rule does not 
apply as a matter of law, then Taco Time should also be allowed to amend its complaint to 
pursue 100% of its damages sustained in the fire against Leishman, which is not entitled to an 
offset for settlement funds recovered from Sign Pro. I.C. 5 6-805(2); Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 
143 Idaho 230, 141 P.3d 1099 (2006). Leishman concedes the point where it "agrees that 'joint 
and several liability' with Sign Pro is not appropriate." Respondent's Brief, (G), p. 34. Taco 
Time requests this Court's opinion also address and rule on the amendment issue. 
11. THE "ENTIMf BUILDING" IS NOT THE "SUBJECT OF 
THE TRANSACTION" FOR PURPOSES OF THE 
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE 
The district court's and Leishman's contention that the "property which is the subject of 
the transaction" is the "entire building" is the dispositive issue on the economic loss issue on this 
appeal; all else is secondary. Leishman's central reliance on this contention is stated repeatedly 
in its respondent's brief in one way or another. 
For example, at page 14 of its respondent's brief, Leishman states: 
"The trial court followed this guidance [of Blah4 and concluded 
that: 'the various components of the remodeling, including 
electrical rewiring . . . were of necessity integrated with the 
existing building to better facilitate the purpose for which the 
building was used, a restaurant.' Therefore, the trial court 
concluded that the subject of the transaction was the 
resta~rantlbuilding and because 'Plaintiffs damage claims do not 
relate to any property "other than that which is the subject of the 
transaction" the claims are barred by the economic loss rule.' " 
Similarly, at page 23 of its respondent's brief, Leishman states: 
"Following the reasoning of those cases, the trial court was correct 
in concluding that the subject of the transaction in this case was the 
remodeling of the restaurantmuilding, not the neon sign and 
transformer installation contract." 
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At page 25 of its respondent's brief, Leishman states: 
". . . the trial court concluded 'the subject of the transaction with 
which Leishlnan Electric was involved was the remodel project' 
and decided 'that the economic loss rule bars any negligence 
claims asserted against Leishman Electric, except for property 
damage not involved with the remodel project.' " 
As a side note, the internal contradiction and inconsistency between the district court's 
initial partial summary judgment decision, andsubsequent full summary judgment decision, even 
Leishman  acknowledge^.^ The significance of this inconsistency Leishman chooses to avoid for 
reasons which are obvious. 
At page 27 of its respondent's brief, Leishman states: 
"The 'transaction' for purposes of this case is not a business deal 
between Taco Time and Sign Pro to install transformers and a neon 
sign. The trial court correctly concluded that 'the damage claims 
arise from restaurant property damaged by the fire.' R. Vol. 11, p.. 
3041.1 Leishman Electric's only nexus was as a subcontractor to 
the general contractor who was hired to remodel the Taco Time 
building to make it a better restaurant, not to make a building 
which was later converted into a restaurant. Leishman Electric did 
not just wire the transformer to which Sign Pro connected the neon 
signs [Taco Time added f~otnote].~ Leishman Electric rewired 
jLeishman acknowledges the "other property damage" finding of the district court in its 
initial decision: "The trial court did not identify what it thought was damage to 'other property' 
except to note in a footnote that 'some of the damage claims appear to be separate from the 
remodel project.' " I d ,  citing the lower court's partial swnmary judgment decision (R., Vol. I, p. 
102, note 6). Such acknowledged existence of "other property damage" is the central basis upon 
which Taco Time relied arguing unsuccessfully in the district court that the economic loss rule 
did not apply at all. 
4Leishman misrepresents the timing and order of work which the record clearly 
establishes. Sign Pro first installed both the wired sign and the transformer on the building. 
Thereafter, Leishman connected the primary building power to the transformer. Scott 
Leishman's own testimony cited in Taco Time's Opening Brief, establishes his work being done 
afer Sign Pro installed the transformer. R., Voi. I, p. 88. Packer's Affidavit establishes that he 
installed the sign on the building at the same time as the transformer on the roof and connected 
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95% of the entire restaurant building. In Blahd the homeowner 
'purchased the lot as an integrated whole.' Here Taco Time 
purchased a remodeled restaurant and the 'various components of 
the remodeling, including electrical rewiring, installation of signs, 
and other building improvements where wholly integrated into the 
building, not separate and apart from it.' R. Vol. 11, p. 304. It was 
the building and the restaurant which were the subject of the 
transaction." 
At page 7 of its respondent's brief, referring to what it characterizes as "critical evidence 
necessary to decide the application of the economic loss rule," at item 3, Leishman states: 
"The neon signs which were purcllased by Taco Time and repaired 
and installed by Sign Pro were part ofthe remodelproject" 
(emphasis added). 
The trial court clearly ruled, as Leishman's briefs passages quoted above acknowledge, 
that the economic loss rule allegedly "applied" because the neon sign and transformer were 
the two items, and his work was finished. R., Vol. 11, pp. 262-63. The only reason Scott 
Leishman does not know that the neon sign was installed at the other end away from the 
transformer is that he did nor bother to look. R., Vol. I ,  p. 88. Such ignorance was totally self- 
induced, but no excuse for failure to determine that whatever was there was safe to hook up. He 
could have easily done so, and should have, according to Taco Time's expert, Higgins, which 
would have taken him only about "five minutes." R., Vol. I, p. 145. This sleight of hand by 
Leishman obviously seeks to distance itself fiom failure to inspect and determine the lack of 
grounding in the improper wiring of the Taco Time sign letters. Leishman's alleged "factual" 
discussion relates to the transformer only, not the plainly visible mis-wiring of the neon sign 
letters, evidencing its vulnerability for negligent failure to inspect and identify the latter as a fire 
hazard before energizing the building power to the entire circuit. Apparently, it is easier for 
Leishman's expert, Moore, to argue Leishman was allegedly "not negligent" for not opening the 
cover of the transformer to determine if it had secondary ground fault protection, as required by 
the NEC then in effect, than to argue it should not have seen the plainly mis-wired sign letters, 
which Scott Leislman did not bother to even look at. It is indeed interesting that Leishman's 
brief is completely silent on this second hazardous condition, i.e., the mis-wired sign letters 
which lacked ground wiring, and it focuses its "factual" argument on the transformer only. Such 
silence speaks loudly regarding Leishtnan's negligence in energizing the circuit not only with the 
obsolete transformer, but also with the mis-wired letters of the sign lacking ground wiring, and 
without bothering to look, despite the NEC's contrary requirements and its supposed competency 
as the only "licensed electrician" making power connections on site. 
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merely a "part of h e  building" and "part of the remodel project" and, therefore, the "subject of 
the transaction" which caused Leishman to be working on the building. This reasoning is flawed 
and does not support application of the economic loss rule in this case. 
As discussed above, Aardema clearly explains that this Court unanimously and currently 
considers that the "subject of the transaction" for purposes of the economic loss rule is the 
"subject matter of the underlying contract." Id., at p. 6; see also, note 2 thereto. 
The second issue on appeal was identified by the Court as follows: "(2) whether a 
genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Aardema Dairy suffered any property damage[.Y Id., at 
In discussing this issue, the Court first exhaustively reviewed its prior decisions on the 
economic loss rule, stating: 
"It is a long-held legal maxim that animals are tangible property 
and that intentional acts leading to the destruction or loss of such 
chattels give rise to a cause of action[.]" Oppenheimer Indus., Inc. 
v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 423,426,732 P.2d 661,664 
(1986). Economic loss is distinguishable from property damage, 
which would be recoverable under a tort claim. "Property damage 
encompasses damage to property other than that which is the 
subject of the transaction. " Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 196, 
983 P.2d 848, 850 (1999) (emphasis original) (quoti~lg Salmon 
Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc., 97 Idaho at 351 544 P.2d at 309). 
This Court has not defined the "subject of the transaction," instead 
relying on factual comparisons from previous decisions. Blahd v. 
RichavdB. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,301, 108 P.3d 996, 1001 
(2005) (finding that the house and the lot are the subject of the 
transaction and, therefore, constitute economic loss where the 
allegation is damage to the house from the settling foundation); 
Ramerth, 133 Idaho at 197, 983 P.2d at 851 (finding that repair of 
the engine is the subject of the transaction if the allegedly negligent 
repair subsequently causes need for further repair to the engine); 
Dufin, 126 Idaho at 1007,895 P.2d at 1200 (finding that no 
property loss, other than property which is the subject of the 
transaction, existed when delivered and certified seed is found to 
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contain bacterial ring rot); Tusch Enlers. v. Cofin, 1 13 Idaho 37, 
41,740 P.2d 1022, 1026 (1987) (holding that allegations of 
negligent design and construction of a duplex is barred by the 
economic loss rule); Oppenheimer Indus, Inc., 112 Idaho at 426, 
732 P.2d at 664 (holding that a tori action may be maintained when 
the plaintiff alleged that his cattle were sold without his permission 
because the cattle brand inspector failed to verify cattle ownership 
prior to the sale). This line of cases delineates a clear puttern that 
this Court has implicitly defined the "subject of the transaction" by 
the subject matter ofthe contract. [footnote 21. 
Id., at p. 6. 
Footnote 2, referred to in the above quote, states: 
In Blahd this Court stated that the case law "indicate[s] the word 
'transaction,' ibr purposes of the economic loss rule, does not mean 
a business deal-it means the subject of the lawsuit." Blahd, 141 
Idaho at 300, 108 P.3d at 1000. However, if the subject of the 
transaction is defined as the subject of the lawsuit essentially every 
claim would he barred by the economic loss rule. Instead we read 
this overbroad language from Blahd to mean that ihe underlying 
contract that is the subject of the lawsuit is the subject of the 
transaction." (emphasis original) 
In light of the above case law and footnote clarification of what Blahd meant with regard 
to the "subject of the transaction," the Court's opinion continued: 
"U.S. Dairy argues that the cows are the subject of the transaction; 
however, this argument is strained. Based on the preceding case 
law, the milking machines are the subject of the transaction. 
Aardema Dairy did not contract with any of the defendants for the 
cattle, but for the purchase, installation and operation of the 
milking system. In this case, the subject matter of the contract is 
the milking system and not the cattle that are milked. Therefore, on 
remand the inquiry is whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact that there is damage to the cows 
which amounts to more than the failure of the milking equipment 
to meet Aardema Dairy's expectations. 
Evidence existed that the wiring at Aardeman (sic) Dairy was 
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faulty and that faulty wiring would lead to improperly operating 
milking equipment. An expert opined that 'if the pulsator isn't 
working properly . . . the blood circulation through the . . . teat end 
wouldn't be adequate and it could injure the cow.' (Emphasis 
added). Aardema Dairy also presented evidence that its loss 
extended to 'reduced milk production, loss of price premium from 
reduced milk quality, loss of dairy capital and loss of present 
value' all allegedly stemming from the physical damage to the 
cattle. On remand, if the only damage that is produced is in the 
form of lost milk production, quality and profits and not actual 
physical damage to the cows then this is purely economic loss; that 
is, the failure of the milking equipment to produce the products and 
profits anticipated by Aardema Dairy." 
Id., pp. 6-7. 
Thus, in Aarderna, the Defendant U.S. Dairy argued that the "cows" were the "subject of 
the transaction," not the milking system used on them. This Court rejected this argument. It held 
the milking machines, not the cows, were the "subject of the transaction." 
In the instant case, Leishman, like U.S. Dairy, argues that the "entire building," not the 
contract with Sign Pro to install the neon sign and transformer, nor the remodel contract wit11 the 
general contractor, nor the electrical subcontract of Leishman, was the "subject of the 
transaction." Such is flawed and erroneous. Such violates the Court's "bottom line" 
characterization and summary of its prior case law dealing with economic loss distilled as 
meaning: 
"This line of cases delineates a clear pattern that this Court has 
implicitly defined the 'subject of the transaction' by the subject 
matter of the contract." 
In Aardema, there was no clear evidence whether there was actual damage to the cows 
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which would support recovery for the purely economic damages claim for lost milk production, 
quality, and profits. Thus, the summary judgment granted by the lower court was reversed and 
the case remanded for resolution ofthat factual issue. Id., p. 7. 
As discussed above, in contrast, in the instant case, there is ample - indeed overwhelming 
-evidence of damage to the building other than g y  of the three arguable underlying contracts 
involved (i.e., Carson-Sign Pro contract for neon sign and transformer repair and installation; 
Larson-General Contractor building remodel contract; or General Contractor-Leishman Electric 
electrical subcontract as part of the building remodel). Thus, here, it does not make any 
dfference which one of the three arguable underlying contracrs are the "subject of the 
transaction" for purposes of the economic loss rule being determined nof aqnlicable. 
The evidence is clear that there was enormous damage to the entire building - old and 
new, remodeled or not - and also damage to equipment; fixtures; inventory; supplies, etc. See 
Second Affidavit of Brian Larsen, pp. 109-1 11, and attached as Exs. B (corrected) and E (R., 
Vol. I, pp. 118, 128-141). Indeed, how could there g& be extensive damage to the building and 
all contents from this major building fire conflagration, which common sense and all the physical 
evidence, including fire investigator Jacobsen's report, affidavit, and photos, clearly establish. 
See, Jacobsen Affidavit and attachments (R., Vol. I, pp. 234-260). 
Owner Larsen's Affidavit also states: 
"The majority of the fire damage was sustained in the original 
portions of the building. Approximately forty (40) linear feet of 
exterior wall had to be removed and replaced after the fire. Eight 
and one half feet (8.5') of the replaced exterior wall was a part of 
the original building structure." 
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Second Larsen Affidavit, 7 7 (R., Vol. I, p. 1 I 1). Such testimony is undisputed. Such testimony 
alone establishes that there was "other property damage" which was IlSLt the subject of any of the 
three (3) arguable "transactions" involved in this case identified above. 
Therefore, as discussed in the Summary above, any three of the arguable contracts 
Ptween identified are not the "entire building," but only lesser parts of it. The first contract b, 
Taco Time-Sign Pro is only the two neon signs and two transformers. The second contract 
between Taco Time-General Contractor is the remodeling which occuned to parts of the existing 
building, but there is no doubt it was not the "entire building" as some portions of the original 
building pre-existed the remodeling project. The third contract is the General Contractor- 
Leishman electrical subcontract, which only involved the electrical system rewiring and 
updating. Thus, there is "no contract" which is the subject of the "entire building" for 
construction or remodel or anything else. The "entire building" "theory" of Leishman, and the 
lower court, being the "subject of the transaction" or "subject of the underlying contract," under 
any one of the three arguable contracts involved, do not incorporate or include the "entire 
building." 
Taco Time submits that since the neon sign and transformer have been identified as the 
origin and cause of the fire, not other aspects of the remodel work by the general contractor or 
Leishman's work as the electrical subcontractors, then logically that is the "underlying contract" 
which is the "subject of the transaction" for purposes of the economic loss rule. Clearly, the 
entire rest of the building, and all the equipment, inventory, and other contents, were therefore 
"other property damage" resulting from the fire and, therefore, the economic loss rule does not 
apply. Such conclusion is consistent with Aardema and all the Court's prior line of case law on 
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the econo~nic loss rule. 
However, as discussed above, Taco Time believes it is unnecessary to identify one of the 
three "underlying contracts," since the result is the same with any of them. There is still "other 
property damage" which exists, rendering the economic loss rule non-applicable as a matter of 
In Aardema,.supra at p. 6, this Court found U.S. Dairy's argument that the cows were the 
subject of the transaction "strained." The same is true of Leishman's argument, and trial court's 
characterization, that the "entire building" was the "subject of the transaction" herein. Aardema 
requires a different conclusion limited to one or more of the three contracts identified above. 
Which one makes no difference, as they are all limited to less than the "entire building" where 
"other damage" occurred. Even setting the entirety of the building aside, the "other damage" to 
equipment, fixtures, inventory, contents and other personal property, etc., which were clearly 
the "subject of any transaction" or "subject of any underlying contract," are sufficient to establish 
that the economic loss ruled simply does not apply. Rather, traditional tort rules apply allowing 
recovery of all property damages, including all economic losses, i.e., lost profits. 
111. THE OCCURRENCE OF AN "ACCIDENT" OR "CALAMITOUS 
EVENT" IS SZGMFZC'T FOR CONSIDERING WHETHER THE 
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE APPLIES 
Leishman conte~lds that a "calamitous event" is not a recognized exception to the 
economic loss rule. Leishman mis-characterizes and misconstrues Taco Time's argument in this 
regard. Taco Time submits it is significant whether there is an "accident" or "calamitous event" 
occurrence in considering whether the economic loss rule applies under Idaho case law. 
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Moreover, Leishman mis-characterizes Taco Time's argument by suggesting Taco Time 
urges this Court recognize a "new exception" or adopt a "minority rule" in Idaho. Taco Time 
emphatically does no such thing. 
Apparently, it is Leishman who refuses to acknowledge or comprehend this Court's prior 
case law which so suggests. 
Aardema, supra at pp. 4-5, quotes with approval and reaffirms the leading seminal quote 
from Dean Prosser's Handbook on the Law of Torts, also quoted with approval in Clark v. 
International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326,333,581 P.2d 784,791 (1978), as follows: 
"There can be no doubt that the seller's liability for negligence 
covers any kind of physical hann, including not only personal 
injuries, but also property damage to the defective chattel itself, as 
where an automobile is wrecked by reason of its own bad brakes, 
as well as damage to any other property in the vicinity. But where 
there is no accident, and no physical damage, and the only loss is a 
pecuniary one, through loss of the value or use of the thing sold, or 
the cost of repairing it, the courts have adhered to the rule, to be 
encountered later, that purely economic interests are not entitled to 
protection against mere negligence, and so have denied the 
recovery." (emphasis added) 
Aardema, supra at p. 5 ,  also cites the Court's prior decision in Myers v. A. 0. Smith 
Harvestore Prod., Inc., 114 Idaho 432,436,757 P.2d 695,699 (1988), described as "holding that 
decreased milk production in cows caused by a defective feed storage system is not an injury 
from a 'calamitous event or dangerous failure of the product' and is merely the product's failure 
to meet the plaintiff's expectations[.]" 
The above-quoted "accident" language of Clark, and "calamitous event" language of 
Myers, both point to a conclusion that damages which result from such circumstances are 
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likely to be "purely economic losses," i.e., a mere failure to meet the buyer's or user's 
"expectations." It is therefore highly material and relevant in determining whether the economic 
loss rule applies -or does not - to consider such circumstances. Where property damage arises 
out of an "accident" or "calan~itous event," resulting from an actor's negligence or a product 
defect, then, in all likelihood, by definition, inevitable consequence, or accompanying 
cjrcz~mtance, there is likely "other property damage" to the thing itself (e.g., car wrecked due to 
bad brakes per Prosser's example quoted in Clark), or some "other property," or possible 
"personal injury." In such case, the economic loss rule does not apply. 
Rather, in such a case, basic tort rules apply allowing recovery for such property damage 
or personal injury, together with any damages that are also characterized as "economic losses" 
under the "parasitic" rule. Aardema, szpva; Clark, supra; Duffin, supra. See also, voluminous 
case law both from and other jurisdictions cited in Appellant's Opening Brief, (II)(A and B), pp. 
21-30, which will not be revisited as unnecessary. 
IV. LEISflXIAN'S RELIANCE ON CASE LAW WHERE 
THERE IS NO "OTHER PROPERTY DAMAGE" ARE 
DISTINGUISHABLE 
To the extent Leishman cites and relies on case law where no "other property damage" 
exists, particularly product liability cases where the only issue is damage to the product itseIf, or 
costs to repair it, such cases are clearly distinguishable. 
For example, Leishman's relies on U.S. District Judge Winmill's Memorandum Decision 
and Order in J. R. Simplot Co. v. Havnischfeger Corporation, Civil Case No. 9700490-E-BLW 
("Winmill Decision"). Such reliance is misplaced. This case involved Simplot's effort to 
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recover from the manufacturer the value of a hydraulic ~nining shovel, model 1200B. At the 
outset, the court stated: 
"Some 10 years later [after its purchase], on April 3, 1997, the 
1200B caught fire and was severely damaged or destroyed. Its 
operator, Tommy Cynova, was not injured, and there was no 
damage to any property except to the 1200B itself." 
id., at p. 1. Judge Winmill's purpose in stating the undisputed facts in the above quote is clear. 
He wanted to point out and emphasize that the case was not one involving personal injury, and 
was nof one of danlage to "other property." If such had been the case, then the economic loss 
rule would not have applied, which is implicit. Rather, he sought to clarify that this was solely a 
cased of damage to the 1200B mining equipment itself when it caught fire from its own 
operation. Such circumstances resulted in damages for repair or replacement of the 1200B itself 
only which, by definition, is "pure economic loss" as defined in the Idaho case law cited in 
Aarderna and going back to Salmon Rivers. 
Thus the Simplot case is completely distinguishable from the instant case and no authority 
to support applying the economic loss rule herein. I-Iere, the electrical fire started in a defective 
neon sign, which was not grounded. Such fire was not prevented by a secondary ground fault 
protection safety featwe, which should have been but was not a safety feature of the sign's 
transformer, making it an obsolete device which violated the NEC. Leishman admittedly 
connected the building power energizing the electrical circuit and these devices. Leishman did 
so after Sign Pro installed the transformer on the building and the neon sign on the exterior wall 
and ran the electrical connection between them only. An electrical fire eventually occurred. The 
fire was a large one. The fire spread throughout large portions of the building before it was 
APPELLANT TACO TIME'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 16 
discovered. The fire caused extensive damages to the building (old and new, remodeled or not), 
and also to most of the equipment, fixtures, inventory, supplies, etc. Costs of repair and 
replacement of the damaged building and other property is nearly $300,000. These facts, which 
are established by the evidentiaty record in this case, and essentially undisputed, differ hugely 
from the 1200B mining equipment which caught fire from its own operation involved in the 
Simplot case. The facts are not remotely comparable. The Simplot case does not involve other 
extensive damage to a building or other personal property. Plainly, it is no authority to invoke 
the economic loss rule in this case. 
For the same reasons, Leishman's reliance on East River S.S. Corp. v. Transumericu 
Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986)(applying admiralty law), is also misplaced. In Eust River S.S. 
Corp., the manufacturer designed, built, and installed turbine engines in ships that were 
eventually chartered by the charterers. The turbine engines were defective and required repair. 
The charterers filed an action in tort against the manufacturer, seeking to recover the costs of the 
repairs. The district court entered summary judgment for the manufacturer. The appellate court 
upheld the district court's decision. The appellate court's order was affirmed on certiorari review. 
The court held that the economic loss doctrine applied in admiralty cases. The charterers 
sustained purely ecollomic losses when the turbine engines failed; only the turbines themselves 
were damaged when they failed. As the failure of the turbine engines to properly function was 
the essence of a breach of warranty action, the charterers had to pursue a warranty action to 
recover. 
Presumably, if the turbine engines were not the only damage, but had started a fire which 
spread throughout the rest of the ship, destroying or causing it significant other damage, or 
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causing it to sink, then the opposite result would have occurred. The latter situation is obviously 
the one analogous to the instant case, not the actual facts of the East Rivev S.S. Corp. case. 
The sane may be said of most, if not all, of the case law cited in Leishman's brief, 
particularly the ones from outside Idaho. Where Taco Time considers that governing Idaho case 
law exists, particularly as recently further clarified or developed in the Aavdernu, it is frankly not 
useful, productive, necessary to engage in further discussion of other non-Idaho case law cited in 
Leishman's brief. 
V. THE "INTEGRATED WHOLE" CONCEPT DOES NOT 
MAKE THE ECONOMC LOSS RULE APPLICABLE 
Leishman seeks to bolster its argument that the economic loss rule applies invoking the 
"integrated whole" concept as applied in Bluhd and Tusch Enters. v. CofJin, 113 Idaho 37,740 
P.2d 1022 (1987). Such concept does not apply here. Leislman misconstrues and misapplies it. 
If anything, the undisputed facts establish that the "integrated whole" concept clearly does not 
apply and therefore the economic loss rule also does apply. 
The "integrated whole" concept as previously considered in Blahd and Tusch Enters. 
involved a new building constructed on lot. The buildingilot "unit" was then sold as an 
"integrated whole" to the respective buyers who purchased them as such. 
They did not involved remodeling of an existing building. They did not involve an 
existing owner of a building who had it remodeled in part, and neon signs and related 
transformers added, under different contracts with different persons, which later started a fire. 
Such cases did involve damages from gradual settling of the building structure built on 
the foundations due to site preparation inadequacies. They did not involve an electrical fire 
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which was a sudden "accident" or "calamitous event." 
Such cases involved settling damages only to the building as described. They did not 
involve a fire incident which substantially destroyed or damaged the entirety of the building, 
equipment, fixtures, inventory, and other contents including personal property located within. 
The similarity of Blahd and Tusch Enters. to this case starts and ends with the fact that 
they all involved property damage to buildings. The underlying rationale for applying the 
economic loss rule there does not apply to the instant case given the obvious dissimilarities. 
Such cases are distinguishable. 
VI. LEISHMAN'S "ENTIRE BUILDING" THEORY 
PRODUCES ABSURD RESULTS AND IS AGAINST 
PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVITY ARGUMENT IS 
UUUZLEVANT, AND EFFORTS TO BLAME OTHER 
THIRD PARTIES DOES NOTHING TO D m S H  
LIABILITY FOR ITS OWN NEGLIGENCE 
Leishman's "entire building" theory is sought to be bolstered by various "kitchen sink" 
arguments sprinkled throughout its brief. Such arguments produce absurd results; violate public 
policy; raise privily of contract which is irrelevant in a negligence action; and seek to prejudice 
by casting blame on other actors. Such arguments merely serve to confuse and distract. Such 
arguments are irrelevant and do nothing to diminish Leishman's liability for its own negligence 
as may be determined by a jury as the licensed electrical contractor which energized an electrical 
circuit line as part of its remodel work in the Taco Time building, despite their non-compliance 
with the NEC, and without bothering to inspect them to determine whether they did comply or 
were otherwise safe. Leishman is responsible for its own negligence in contributing to the cause 
of the fire regardless of other actors' arguable coilcurring negligence, which is for the jury to 
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determine in this case. Such arguments have nothing to do with whether summary judgment was 
properly granted on the basis of the economic loss rule which is the dispositive issue on this 
appeal. 
In addition, footnote 2 to the Aardema opinion is appropriately raised here. As the Court 
narrowed or limited the broad language in Blakd stating: "However, if the subject of the 
transaction is defined as the subject of the lawsuit essentially every claim would be barred by the 
economic loss rule. Instead we read this overbroad language from Blakd to mean that the 
underlying contract that is the subject of the lawsuit is the subject of the transaction" (emphasis 
original). Aardema, supra at p. 6, note 2. 
Under Leishman's "theory" of economic loss, anyone who did anything to repair or install 
anything in any building, however negligently, which resulted in damage to the entire building 
and contents, would be insulated from liability because whatever item they repaired or worked on 
or installed was "part of the entire building." This is an absurd result. 
For example, under Leishman's alleged "theory" of economic loss, a company could 
improperly install a boiler or furnace, causing an explosion, which substantially destroys the 
building, and yet be immune .from liability for any damage to the whole building or contents. 
Many analogous situations involving damages caused by negligent repair or installation of all 
kinds of equipment and devices by electricians, plumbers, contractors, or anyone else are readily 
conceivable. 
It is self-evident that such a "legal rule" would tremendously undermine public safety and 
allow wrongdoers to escape liability leaving the injured party without remedy or compensation. 
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Such a legal rule would completely undermine the licensing requirements for skilled trades 
persons such as electricians, plumbers, etc. Such licensed persons should be deemed "quasi- 
professionals" for purposes ofthe economic loss rule. By reason of licensure, sucll persons hold 
themselves out to the public as having expertise in a specialized function, which induces reliance 
on its performance. See, Dufin, supra. Indeed, there is no point to licensing if it implies no 
expertise, qualifications, or specialized competency. 
Leishman argues that the lack of direct privity between itself and Taco Time is a reason 
that no "special exception" should be recognized for a licensed electrical subcontractor, or its 
employeeiprincipal, Scott Leishinan, who did the work as an 18 year experienced licensed 
electrician. Leishman argues the lack of direct privity establishes a lack of reliance. Sadly, such 
is not the case. Taco Time may not have had a direct contract or privity with Leisbman, but it did 
with the general contractor, who hired Leishman via a conventional electrical subcontract in the 
ordinary course of the construction business. Naturally, Taco Time and Larson relied on the 
general contractor to hire a competent and licensed electrician to perform the electrical 
subcontract portion of the remodeling work. 
It is not reasonable or necessary, and should not be legally required, that Taco Time 
cannot pursue action against Leishxnan as the hired licensed electrical subcontractor for its 
negligence in performing the work in such manner as to create a fire hazard; for failing to inspect 
and do whatever else was reasonable and necessary to ensure the safety of the transformer and 
neon sign before energizing ihe electrical circuit as the last step in that part of its activities, where 
such facts are established. 
It is precisely because there is no contractual privity between Taco Time and Leishman 
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that it is necessary and essential that it be allowed a remedy in negligence law. Such is in accord 
with traditional negligence and tort principles. The economic loss rule should not be so broadly 
read or applied as to totally bar any and all right of action by Taco Time against Leishman for its 
licensed electrician's negligence. Indeed, the failure to comply with the NEC in two respects: 
failure to inspect and ensure a transformer with the required secondary ground fault protection 
was part of the neon sign components before connecting and energizing it; and failure to inspect 
and insure that the neon sign was wired with proper grounding, would appear sufficient to 
establish negligence. 
Leishman makes many arguments and excuses for why it should not have had to do so, 
while never denying the plain NEC provisions so requiring. If Taco Time cannot rely on the 
licensed electrical contractor, or its employeelowner who is an 18 year experienced and licensed 
electrician, to ensure that the electrical work done as part of the remodeling, including connecting 
and energizing those components' electrical circuit line, then it is not apparent who has such 
responsibility. 
Taco Time's experts are clear that such is and was Leishman's responsibility given its 
licensure. The NEC's provisions, and Idaho Administrative Code's provisions, which are 
included in the appendix to Taco Time's Opening Brief, appear to plainly impose such duties and 
responsibilities on Leishman as the electrical contractor who did such work. It is no surprise that 
Leishman ignores such provisions and its legal duties and responsibilities as set forth therein; 
Leishman clearly failed to meet them, which constitutes negligence on its part. 
Leishman also makes many arguments about "privity" Taco Time had with other parties, 
i.e., the restaurant from which it purchased the older used neon signs and transformers; the 
APPELLANT TACO TIME'S REPLY BRIEF -Page 22 
general contractor; Sign Pro, etc.; Taco Time's potential remedies against those persons or 
entities; and seeks to case blame or fault on them. Taco Time's alleged privity with other actors, 
any arguable remedies which may exist against them, or their arguable comparative negligence, 
does nothing to render Leishman unaccountable its own concumng negligence which caused the 
subject fire. Comparative negligence arguments are appropriate at trial before a jury, but 
immaterial to this appeal. 
The point of this appeal, of course, is that at present Taco Time is denied a trial based on 
the sua sponte summary judgment decision of the trial court issued on Taco Time's motion for 
reconsideration of its prior partial sunmary judgment decision. Such occurred despite the lack of 
any motion even being made by Leishnan, but was apparently an effective way to move the case 
of the district court's docket. 
Leishman's "kitclien sink" arguments should be rejected as without merit. 
VII. LEISHMAN FAILS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS APPEAL IS 
FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST TACO TIME 
AND THE APPROPRIATE STAh'DARD OF REVIEW 
At the outset of its brief, Leishman makes various statements and comments which seem 
to indicate confusion about the posture of the case being Taco Time's appeal from the summary 
judgment against it entered below, and the familiar summary judgment standard in such a posture 
that all facts and inferences therefrom must be made in favor of Taco Time and against 
Leishman. Such is undoubtedly the law and the posture of this case. The district court granted 
summary judgment against Taco Time. The fact that such procedurally resulted from Taco 
Time's motion for reconsideration of the lower court's earlier partial summary judgment decision 
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does not change the decision appealed from. 
Further, Taco Time is not appealing the lower court's of its own summary judgment 
motion, as Leishman wrongly suggests at page 3 of its respondent's brief. 
Given its appeal from the summary judgment decision against it, Taco Time is entitled to 
the standard of review under IRCP 56 where all facts and iaferences are consilxed on appeal ill 
its favor. Aardeman, supra at p. 3. Any other suggestion by Leishman to the contrary is plainly 
wong. Id 
It is doubtful Leishman is unclear about the procedural status. Leishman purports to raise 
its so-called "point of clarification" as a pretextual tactic or device to launch into its own self- 
serving "statement of facts," which does not respect the IRCP 56 standard given Taco Time's 
appeal from the summary judgment entered against it. Taco Time's Opening Briefs "statement 
of facts" comports with IRCP 56 and the summaty judgment standard which applies; Leishman's 
clearly does not5 Leishman merely argues self-serving facts to try and explain away its own 
negligence with respect to its electrical work, failure to comply with the NEC, failure to inspect 
5Actually, Taco Time believes the material facts are largely undisputed a set forth in its 
Statement of Facts. Who did what work where and when is established by Packer's and Scott 
Leishman's testimony. The contracts and dealings between Taco Time and ownerlpriucipal 
Brian Larsen, as set forth in the Complaint and his first and second Affidavits, are undisputed. 
The damages to the building, equipment, inventory, contents, etc., are undisputed. Leishman's 
admitted conduct wiring and energizing the circuit without inspecting the transformer or the sign 
wiring and determining whether it was safe to do, which turns out not to be the case, given the 
NEC's violations due to the transformer's lack of secondary ground protection safety device, and 
improper wiring without any grounding of the neon sign, are undisputed. Really, the only 
arguable "factual" dispute is Leishman's expert Paul Moore's contradiction of Taco Time's 
experts "opinion" to the effect Leishman had no responsibility and didn't have to comply wit11 
the NEC or otherwise ensure the safely of the circuit and its components prior to connecting the 
building power and energizing them. 
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the transformer and neon sign's wiring, to minimize its own responsibility for the resulting fire 
hazard and seek to case blame on Larson, Sign Pro, or anyone else it can think of. 
W I .  RECOVERABILITY OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS 
NOT RIPE AND IS UNNECESSARY 
In the event of reversal and remand, Leishman seeks this Court's ruling that prejudgment 
interest claimed by Taco Time is not recoverable as a matter of law. Taco Time submits such a 
ruling from this Court is not ripe and is unnecessary. Recoverability of prejudgment interest 
depends on various facts and factors which are better determined at trial, not on this appeal as a 
matter of law. The issue is not so "black and white" as Leishman suggests. 
The legal rate of interest in tort cases where property is damaged or destroyed is 12% per 
annum, as provided in Idaho Code i j  28-22-104(2). See, Schenk v. Smith, 1 17 Idaho 999, 1000- 
01 (1990). When real property is damaged but repairable, the measure of damages is the cost of 
repair plus prejudgment interest from the date of the loss to the entry of judgment. Nampa & 
Mevidian Irrigation Dist. v. Mussell, 139 Idaho 28,33 (2003). 
Prejudgment interest on personal property is recoverable if the value of the personal 
property has a readily identifiable market value that can be determined by an objective, 
recognized standard. Id. at 1001. 
The property damaged in this case is both real property and fixtures, and personal 
property including equipment, inventory, etc. While there is a large amount of damages given 
the severity of the large fire, it is not readily apparent that such are not liquidated or 
mathematically ascertainable according to appropriate measures and standards. Indeed, such was 
done as a matter of property loss adjustment by Taco Time's property insurer with it, which has 
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been fully produced and shared with Leishman early on in the case. The summary of categories 
and amounts are shown in Exhibit B (corrected) to the Second Larsen Affidavit (R., Vol. I, p. 
118), and the volu~ninous underlying documentation which supports it, also all produced early on 
in discovery to Leishman. 
It is also significant that the date of the fire loss was June 9,2004, which is a very long 
time, and if this Court grants Taco Time relief sought on appeal and reverses and remands for 
trial, the likelihood of much further delay until trial, and possible second appeal, remain. The 
purposes of allowing prejudgment interest is to provide full and complete compensation; to 
provide a disincentive for delay; and to enhance settlement possibilities. Such purposes are 
frustrated and not served if a ruling on this appeal unnecessarily addresses the prejudgment 
interest issue. 
M. ATTORNEY FEES ARE PR0PERL;Y AWARDED TO TACO TIME 
Finally, Taco Time submits that this is an appropriate case for an award of attorney fees 
on appeal. This Court's prior case law on the economic loss rule plainly establishes that the 
economic loss rule does not apply. Leishman's efforts were successfuI in confusing and 
misleading the district court into granting partial summary judgment initially, and full summary 
'judgment ultimately. The basis for doing so was merely that the "entire building" was the 
subject of the transaction for purposes of the economic loss rule. Such is patently contrary to the 
well settled interpretation and proper application of the economic loss rule and grossly 
overbroad. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing Reply Brief, its Opening Brief, and the entire record herein, 
Appellant Taco Time respectfully seeks this Court's decision as follows: 
1. Reversing the summaq judgment based on the economic loss rule below and 
holding such rule does not apply to this case as a matter of law given the undisputed facts of 
"other property damage," or for one of the other reasons relied on; 
2. Directing the lower court to grant its motion for leave to file its proposed amended 
complaint so that 100% of the damages sustained in the fire, without offset for settlemei~t monies 
recovered from Sign Pro, may be pursued against Leishman at trial; 
3. Awarding Taco Time attorney fees incurred on appeal; 
4. Denying Leishman's request for a ruling that prejudgment interest is not 
recoverable as a matter of law which is premature and unnecessary. 
?$6f September. 2009. Respectfully submitted this ___
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
By: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Brian and 
Christie, Inc., d/b/a Taco Time 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ih dttK I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the - ay f September, 2009, I served two (2) true and 
correct copies of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) by regular U.S. 
Mail: 
Gary L. Cooper 
COOPER & LARSEN, CI-IARTE-D 
151 N. 31dAve., Ste. 210 
P. 0. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
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'"&, Erpe,tris CodB-L ~ s m ~ s * & P ~ o t r c t ~ x ' '  
August 21,2006 
John Goodeil, Attorney 
Mchrse, Qlsesera, Nye, et a1 
201 East Center Street 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
RE: Taco TimeJBri.an Larsen 
Date of Loss: 6-9-04 
Civil Case #: CV-05;884 (Madison Countyldaho) 
Our File #: 24-2392 $L 
Dear Mr. Goodell: I 
Thank you for your telephone conversation this evening regarding the above captioned 
litigation matter. After our discussion, it appears that the adverse counsel, Mr. Brian D. 
Harper, is confused about the determinations of origin and cause by this office and also 
by the Engineer, Dr. Scott Kimbrough of MRA Forensic Sciences. 
May I offer this letter as a clarification regarding those issues. In view of that I've also 
duplicated photographs that I took duritig my investigation, blown them up in a larger 
format .for clarification purposes. Hopefully, with these additional documents and 
photographs, as I truly believe in the old adage that'a picture is worth a thousand words," 
will add clarification to the issue and resolve the matter. 
With that said; I will further reiterate that the origin of this. fire occurred inside of the 
parapet wall, slightly above the roof membrane, on the interior surfaces of the parapet 
wall. I n  proximity to that location were the electrical sign circuitry within conduit that 
ultimately exited.from the exterior surface, to the interior surface, and then ran to the 
transformer. The transformer was positioned on top of the roof. 
The roof construction consisted of a '/2" thick rubber membrane that had a mineral 
coating that would offer additional surface protection, which would also inhibit or delay 
flame penetration for a fire within the parapet waIl and below the sub-roof, as noted in 
photographs #I3 and #63. 
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This is an important factor in view OF the fire travel in ffiis incident. While the fire 
originated within the parapet wall, the most readily combustible components would have 
been the OSB plywood sub-roof and also the same materials that were used in the 
construction of the parapet wall. The rubber membrane would have been coved and ran 
up the interior surface of the parapet wall. That rubber membrane enhanced the fire to 
burn inside of the open spaces of the concealed attic below the sub-roof and above the 
sheetrock as the path of least resistance and the easier combustible fuel. 
The fire destroyed these readily combustible componentS and propagated to adjacent 1 
combustible material during the duration of the fire. These circumstances and "fall-down 
burning" ied up to the complete destruction of the baseplate for the parapet wall. These i 
are shown in photograph #76, with arrows identifying those specific iocations. The fire 
3 , 
was contained in the channel of the parapet wall by virtue of the Yerticai studs that were t 




Once the fire propagated to the point that the baseplate of the parapet wall was breached, 
additional combusti00 air was offered in the dead space below the sub-roof and above the 
sheetrock wall. That combustion air allowed the fire to propagate and extend throughout 
that level, again, burning through the easily combustible plywood sub-roof and eventually 
through the rubber membrane which then presented iitseff as open burning on top of the 
roof, as witnessed by various parties that saw the fire during that stage of burning. It is 
also imoortantto understand that the fire continued to burn For an extended periodof time :'I 
prior to the witnesses noticing the flames on top ofthe roof, as the fire was well advanced 
within the attic at this point. 
En this location of erosion, was the dgnage conduit for the brokefi letter 'a". It is shown 
in the photographs and identified by the red arrow in photograph #13. That shows the 
destruction at that location, which is dissimilar to any other position on that wall, roof or 
interior space. The greatest amount ofdestruction occurred in that specific location which 
is iri proximity to the failing point of the letter 'a" and the conduit that is shown in 
photographs #l3, #76 and #77, revealing the greatest degree of oxidation (which is 
generally an indicator of significant hea5)found during theentireinspeaop -. , of the signage 
.>.. material. 
The evidence is clear, the burn patterns are identified in the photqraphs and thes~R@&: 
are in harmony with the findings of MRA ForensicSciences' Engineer, Dr. Scott Kimbrough. 
.. ~~ clar%ka'tion letter. 
His enclosed r.epart will add additional Information to the conclusions offered in this 
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IF  I may be of further assistance in this matter, please contaa me at your earliest 4 
con\/enience, I 




